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merger of giant industries continues, while this decision only points
the way to further monopolization of the oil industry. The implication is that the Anti-Trust Division might do greater service
to the cause of free competition by using its facilities in an adequate
prosecution of the mergers than by picking out technical violations of the anti-trust laws where the effect of the injunction can
be legally nullified. More fundamentally the doubt persists from
the course of recent prosecution policy whether the Anti-Trust
Division as presently constituted has demonstrated its fitness as the
agency for developing the program of combating monopoly and
preserving competition.
T. W. C.

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION-LEAVING EMPLOYMENT VOLUNTARILY WITHOUT CAUSE-"INVOLVING FAULT ON THE PART OF THE

EMPLOYER."-The

claimant terminated her last employment be-

cause her physician advised that she might develop tuberculosis by
reason of the dust condition in her working place. She made no
allegation that her employer was at fault in connection with the
circumstances which caused her to cease work. Her claim for unemployment benefits was denied by the Board of Review, whose
decision was appealed and affirmed by the circuit court. Held,
on appeal, that a person voluntarily leaving employment because
of fear of illness, or any cause not involving fault on the part of
the employer, is not entitled to unemployment benefits. State v. Hix,
54 S. E.2d 198 (W. Va. 1949).
Unemployment compensation provisions were first enacted in
West Virginia in 1936. W. Va. Acts 2d Ex. Sess. 1936, c. 1; cf. id.
S. Con. Res. 4. The purpose, as stated by the legislature is "to
provide reasonable and effective means for the promotion of social
and economic security by reducing as far as practicable the hazards
of employment. In the furtherance of this objective, the legislature establishes a compulsory system of unemployment reserves in
order to... (2) Guard against the menace to health, morals, and
welfare arising from unemployment." W. VA. CODE c. 21A, art. 1,
§1 (Michie, 1943). Under accepted practice in the construction
of statutes, cf. Sale v. Board of Education, 119 W. Va. 193, 192 S. E.
173 (1937); 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §5902 (3d ed.
1943); but cf. Slack v. Jacob, 8 W. Va. 612 (1875), it is in the light
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of the declared legislative purpose that the disqualification section,
under which the claimant was denied benefits and which reads,
"Upon the determination of the facts by the director an individual
shall be disqualified for benefits: (1) for the week in which he
left his most recent work voluntarily without good cause involving
fault on the part of the employer.. ." W. Va. CODE c. 21A, art. 6,
§4 (1) (Michie, 1943) (italics supplied) is to be applied.
Such a disqualification provision can be divided into two
parts: (1) that he left work voluntarily; and (2) that he left work
without good cause involving fault on the part of the employer.
Cf. Moulton v. Iowa Employment Security Comm'n, 239 Iowa 1161,
34 N. W.2d 211 (1948); Kempfer, Disqualification for Voluntary
Leaving and Misconduct, 55 YALE L. J. 147, 154 (1945). The court
in the principal case defined "voluntary" as "a free exercise of the
will." See 54 S. E.2d at 201. An alternative and better view is
that the mere fact that a worker wills to leave his job does not
necessarily mean voluntary leaving. Extraneous factors must be
taken into account. Craig v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 83 Ohio App. 247, 83 N. E.2d 628 (1948). To quit because
of illness is compulsory and not voluntary. Fannon v. Federal
Cartridge Corp., 219 Minn. 306, 18 N. W.2d 248 (1945); Hoffstot
v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 164 Pa. Super.
43, 63 A.2d 355 (1945).
When section 4 (1) was amended by adding "involving fault
on the part of the employer", compare W. Va. Acts 2d Ex.
Sess. 1936, c. 1, art. 6, §4 (1) with W. Va. Acts 1943, c. 76,
art. 6, §4 (1), the legislative purpose was to protect the unemployment trust fund more adequately. See Loeb, Recent Amendments to the West Virginia Unemployment Compensation Law,
49 W. VA. L. Q. 122, 127 (1943). The court has carried this purpose so far that leaving employment because of unsuitable working
conditions gives no justification unless, in maintaining such conditions, the employer has used deceit or other wrongful conduct.
Amherst Coal Co. v. Hix, 128 W. Va. 119, 35 S. E.2d 733 (1945).
The view in the Amherst Coal case and in the principal case requiring actual wrongs on the part of the employer for the employee quitting work to draw benefit is rested on the mandate of
the legislature. This legislation is a piece-meal change from the
theory and purpose of unemployment compensation legislation
to alleviate the suffering of those involuntarily unemployed. It
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would seem that now the court must look only to the fault of the
employer. The employer may actually be no more at fault than
where consumers quit buying his products, forcing him to cut back
labor costs where nevertheless the employee is allowed to recover
benefits. See, Simrell, Employer Fault vs. General Welfare as a
Basis of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L. J. 181 (1945).
This type of legislation compels the worker to serve under the
penalty of forfeiting certain benefits granted to all workers by law.
The employer can virtually say "This job is inconvenient. Your
own domestic situation, or your health or other good causes counsel that you should abandon this job, but if you do, you will be
deprived of the benefits which now under the law go to all workers
who are without fault unemployed." Montgomery Ward & Co.
v. Board of Review, (Ill. C. C. Cook County, 1941 [quoted 55
IArx L. J. 158 (1945)]).
Another seeming inconsistency is that if a worker quits to preserve his health he is denied benefits. However, if unemployed,
he may refuse to accept unsuitable work and still retain benefits.
"In determining whether work is suitable for an individual, the
director shall consider:
(1) the degree of risk involved to the
individual's health, safety, and morals." W. VA. CODE c. 21A, art.
6, §5 (Michie, 1943). There is no reason why a worker should
be allowed benefits if he refuses to acc pt work which will endanger his health when he is forced tw suffer disqualification
penalties when he quits work to preserve his health. Fannon v.
bederal Cartridge Co., supra.

J.ILH.

WiLs-TniE FOR CONTEST-ADMISSION TO PROBATE OF NONTESTAMENTARY INSTRuMNT.-Decedent died in Monongalia County,

leaving an unwitnessed, typewritten testamentary paper signed by
him, naming his wife as sole beneficiary. In an ex parte proceeding,
the county clerk of that county admitted this paper to probate on
December 27, 1944, and an order confirming probate was entered
on December 28, 1944. W. VA. CODE c. 41, art. 5, §11 (Michie,
1948) provides that, "After a judgment or order entered as aforesaid in a proceeding for probate 6x parte, any person interested who
was not a party to the proceeding.. .may proceed by a bill in equity
to impeach or establish the will... and if the judgment or order
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